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In Public Policy Brief No. 79, L. Randall Wray wrote about the Federal
Reserve’s recent interest rate hikes that “the most charitable interpretation
of the Fed’s policy change is that it appears to be premature.” Wray mar-
shaled a convincing array of data on payrolls, employment-to-population
ratios, and other labor market indicators to show “that the current recov-
ery has not yet attained the degree of labor market tightness that was com-
mon in previous recoveries,”and therefore that the threat of inflation was
minimal. Hence, the Fed, in raising rates, was unnecessarily jeopardizing
the economy’s weak recovery.
In this new brief, we learn about the flaws in the Fed’s thinking that
have led to its frequent policy mistakes.Wray traces several strands of cur-
rent central bank thinking back to their roots in the Fed’s internal discus-
sions in the mid-1990s.Transcripts of these discussions have recently been
released, a development that has yielded some disturbing and telling
insights about the way in which monetary policy is formed.
The situation of 1994 closely parallels that of current times.
Unemployment was clearly above its lowest sustainable level,and inflation
was low.Still,the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and its chair-
man, Alan Greenspan, believed that interest rates had to be raised to keep
prices in check. As it turned out, inflation stayed low, even as unemploy-
ment sank to levels previously believed to be inflationary. The Fed’s interest
rate hikes proved to be unnecessary at best and counterproductive at worst.
Not only is the current economic environment reminiscent of 1994,
but so are contemporary justifications for recessionary policies. Wray lists
six tenets of policy making common to both periods: transparency, gradu-
alism, activism, low inflation as the only official goal, surreptitious targeting
of distributional variables, and the neutral rate as the policy instrument to
achieve these goals. The Fed would not be eager to espouse some of these
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principles publicly, but they were all discussed in committee meetings, as
the recently released transcripts make clear—and there is no reason to
think the Fed has changed its philosophy.
Wray shows that this philosophy is convoluted.Fed officials claim that
they are attempting to reach a neutral interest rate that neither provokes
inflation nor causes recession.But they also say that they will not know the
level of the neutral rate until they reach it. Little can be gained by pursu-
ing such a chimerical goal. Moreover, even when the interest rate was far
below its supposedly neutral level,the economy seemed to be free of infla-
tion. Finally, the Fed seems to have painted itself into a corner by promis-
ing in advance a gradual series of interest rate increases. It is small wonder
that the press finds the Fed’s public statements to be somewhat confusing
and cryptic.
The Fed transcripts shed light on the events of 1994 and those of the
present day. I think that it is time for a new approach to monetary policy;
this brief shows why.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
December 2004The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
Introduction
The Federal Reserve has embarked on a series of rate hikes designed to raise
the federal funds rate (FFR) to what it terms “neutrality”—a hypothetical
level that neither stimulates nor impedes growth. As I have argued previ-
ously (Wray 2004), the Fed believed that prior to its first rate hike in June,
monetary policy was too accommodative, which threatened to set off a
round of wage and price increases.While almost all data indicate that labor
markets are still exceedingly “loose”—probably short some five million
jobs—and that there is no real danger of inflation,we should not doubt that
the Fed will continue to raise rates in its quest for the elusive “neutral rate.”
This brief is an extension of Levy Institute Public Policy Brief No. 79
(Wray 2004), which argued that the rate hikes that began in June are pre-
mature. Here, we examine the thinking that currently guides monetary
policy making in the United States. While the brief will not explicitly
examine policy in other nations, it will be fairly obvious that other central
bankers seem to be following similar guidelines. Indeed, it has become
common to refer to a “new monetary consensus,”supposedly agreed upon
by “movers and shakers”in the policy arena. There is a fairly large body of
literature on the theoretical justifications for this consensus. However, I
intend to focus on the Fed’s actual policy making,which can be thought of
as the practical application of prevailing wisdom, as revealed through its
public pronouncements, minutes of recent meetings, and transcripts of
secret discussions at Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings.
Such transcripts are available only from meetings that occurred at least five
years ago,as the Fed maintains a lag on its releases.However,this brief will
argue that transcripts from the 1993–94 period shed light on current pol-
icy making, because the Fed’s actions and public statements in that period
look eerily similar to those of today.
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Further, the U.S. economy in 1993–94 bore a striking resemblance to
that of 2003–04—an emerging “jobless recovery” from a Bush (senior
then,junior now) recession.Fearing future inflation,the Fed quickly began
raising rates in February 1994, even though the economic data did not
indicate much inflationary pressure. Similarly, the Fed raised rates in June
2004 with little evidence of incipient inflation.Thus,in both cases it could
be argued that the Fed acted prematurely—a case already made in Wray
(2004) for the recent hikes, and in Papadimitriou and Wray (1994) for the
earlier rate hikes. Here, I will compare the secret discussions surrounding
the 1994 rate hikes with the public proclamations in 2004 to identify the
Fed’s justifications for tightening policy at the first sign of recovery. I will
argue that the 1994 policy change marked a nascent approach to policy
formation that came to full fruition in 2004. Only time will tell whether
economic performance will recover in coming months,as it eventually did
from the policy mistakes of 1994.
A Practical Application of the New Monetary Consensus?
This brief will argue that the Fed’s policy can be viewed as a practical
application of the new monetary consensus. In the hands of the Fed, pol-




4. Low inflation as the only official goal
5. Surreptitious targeting of distributional variables
6. Neutral rate as the policy instrument to achieve these goals
Surprisingly, all of these principles can be found in an embryonic form in
the Fed’s secret discussions surrounding the 1994 rate hikes.
In 1994,the Fed experimented with greater openness by clearly signal-
ing its intention to raise rates. Over the subsequent decade, the Fed contin-
ued to increase transparency, both by telegraphing its planned moves well
in advance of policy changes and by explicitly announcing interest rate tar-
gets. In 1994, it implemented its tightening through a series of very small
rate hikes. This new approach, which came to be known as gradualism, was
most clearly articulated by Governor Ben S.Bernanke last May.GradualismThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
usually takes the form of very small adjustments of interest rates (usually 25
to 50 basis points, or hundredths of a percentage point) spread out over
periods as long as two or even three years. Ironically, the combination of
openness and gradualism can force the central bank to make policy moves
at the wrong time in order to fulfill market expectations that it has cre-
ated—a problem that the Fed seemed to anticipate back in 1994.
These developments have evolved against the backdrop of a long-term
trend toward increased monetary policyactivism,which contrasts markedly
with Milton Friedman’s famous call for rules rather than discretion.Indeed,
as I’ll show, the Fed believes that a hyperactive policy increases credibility
and that policy ought to be changed before any need for change becomes
apparent. The policy indicator used by the Fed, both in 1994 and now, is
something called a neutral rate, which varies across countries and through
time.Combined with gradualism and activism,this means the central bank
must begin moving the FFR toward the neutral rate many quarters before
it desires to achieve “neutrality,”since only small rate adjustments will nor-
mally be used. However, the neutral rate cannot be recognized until it is
achieved, so it cannot be announced in advance—a paradox that is some-
what in conflict with the Fed’s adoption of increased transparency.Further,
because the neutral rate is uncertain, the Fed must actively but blindly
adjust the FFR, hoping to hit its unseen target. But, as Friedman long ago
warned, an activist policy is just as likely to destabilize the economy as to
stabilize it. Matters are made even worse when policy making is guided by
invisible and shifting neutral rates and fickle market expectations about
policy that are largely fueled by the Fed’s own public musings.
In recent years, it has become virtually a universal given that central
banks ought to pursue only one goal—low inflation. This brief challenges
the Fed’s frequent claim that its only concern is inflation.Actually, the Fed
also targets asset prices and income shares, and it shows a strong bias
against labor and wage-led inflation, even as it tacitly accepts profits-
driven inflation. Both the Fed’s secret discussions and its actions demon-
strate that it is not above the fray,making policy decisions without picking
winners and losers. The truth is the Fed knows its policies have distribu-
tional effects; indeed, its policies operate largely through distributional
impacts—and it considers these in its policy deliberations.10 Public Policy Brief, No. 80
Groping for Targets: Real and Neutral Rates
A previous brief (Wray 2004) examined the current case for rate hikes. I
showed that the only plausible justification for the recent monetary tight-
ening was that an FFR of 1 percent was widely viewed as an accommoda-
tive stance, accepted as a temporary target appropriate to a depressed
economic environment. Inside and outside the Fed, a rate hike was long
viewed as inevitable. As soon as the patient recovered sufficiently to bear
it, the FOMC would begin the bleeding thought to be necessary to fight
inflationary fever. In their public pronouncements, Fed officials have
claimed that the FFR is still far below the neutral rate that will mark the
stopping point of their tightening campaign, so there is little doubt that
the FOMC will continue to raise rates over the coming months and even
years. Where did this notion of a neutral rate originate?
Friedman’s famous call for monetary growth rate rules appeared to
provide an easy guide for policy making: keep money growth at some low
constant rate. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, several countries, most
notably the United States and the United Kingdom, experimented with
such rules, implementing what was called “practical monetarism.” The
goal was to bring inflation down painlessly, that is, without causing lower
growth and higher unemployment.In actuality,economic growth collapsed,
unemployment skyrocketed,and interest rates reached record levels even as
inflation and money growth rose.In the aftermath of that experiment,most
economists eventually concluded that (perhaps for unknown reasons)
money growth was not closely linked to inflation and that the central bank
could not hit money targets. (See Papadimitriou and Wray 1994 for an
examination of the experiment.) The Fed ultimately abandoned any
attempt to hit—or even to announce—reserve or money targets, thus ini-
tiating a search for an alternative target. For a time the Fed toyed with a
variety of indicators and targets for monetary policy formation, including
price indices,“P-star,”surveys of expected inflation,gold prices,and Taylor
rules.In July 1993,Chairman Alan Greenspan announced a new monetary
policy target, the equilibrium “real” interest rate, a rate that he claimed
“would keep the economy at its production potential over time”
(Papadimitriou and Wray 1994, p. 21).
As the real rate is calculated by subtracting expected inflation from the
nominal interest rate, it is not directly observable but instead must beThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
approximated by hunches or surveys of expected inflation, or by extrapo-
lating current inflation data into the future as a proxy for expectations.
Greenspan admitted in 1993 that the equilibrium real rate cannot be esti-
mated “with a great deal of confidence,”but he claimed that estimates can
be accurate enough for monetary policy (Papadimitriou and Wray 1994,
p. 21). In his view, the real rate would forecast economic performance, with
a low real rate predicting imminent growth; thus,the real rate would provide
an early warning signal of incipient inflation. The chairman’s announce-
ment was met with surprise, and economists from a broad cross section of
theoretical approaches rejected the policy as unworkable. Wray and
Papadimitriou (1994) showed that if the Fed had used such a policy in the
past,it would have implemented the wrong policy over half the time,because
the real rate did not correctly predict subsequent economic performance. In
the face of such opposition, the Fed quickly abandoned the real rate target
and has not said much about it since. As we’ll see, however, the Fed’s newest
neutral rate target bears a familial resemblance to the old real rate.
By the mid-1990s, various Fed officials agreed with Governor
Lawrence Lindsey when he said,“We look at a whole raft of variables—we
ignore nothing and we focus on nothing,”or with Governor John LaWare,
who said simply,“I get a feel for what I think is going on”(Papadimitriou
and Wray 1994, p. 49). President Jerry Jordan mused that the Fed couldn’t
even know with certainty what its policy stance was:“In a world where we
do not have monetary aggregates to guide us as to the thrust of monetary
policy actions, we are kind of groping around just trying to characterize
where the stance is” (FOMC 1994, March 22, p. 52). The general tone of
policy formation was likened to reading tea leaves, or as Keith Bradsher
aptly characterized it in the New York Times,“policy formation has become
more intuitive”(Papadimitriou and Wray 1994, p. 49).
As it happened, this kind of intuitive policy making seemed to serve
the Fed well over the next decade. Inside-the-beltway accolades reached a
crescendo with Bob Woodward’s Maestro: Greenspan’s Fed and the
American Boom (2000). Led by the chairman’s “intuition,”the Fed accom-
modated the Clinton expansion, approving of rapid jobs growth and
falling unemployment rates on the conviction that productivity growth
would hold wage-push inflation at bay. It only began to tighten in 1999,
raising its target in a half dozen steps, then quickly reversing course in12 Public Policy Brief, No. 80
January 2001, when the economy sank into recession. Few commentators
have questioned the wisdom of the Fed’s tightening in the face of the
tremendous headwinds created by Clinton’s budget surpluses, but all have
heaped praise on the subsequent rate reductions.The Fed then maintained
low rates until this past June.
Since the latest rate hike,the Fed has been trumpeting the neutral rate
as an indicator for policy formation. When questioned about the neutral
rate, Chairman Greenspan responded:“You can tell whether you’re below
or above,but until you’re there,you’re not quite sure you are there.And we
know at this stage, at one and a quarter percent federal funds rate, that we
are below neutral. When we arrive at neutral, we will know it” (Andrews
2004). Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City President Thomas Hoenig
echoed the chairman, arguing “We are still a long way from a neutral rate
as we proceed through the course of the rest of this year,” leaving little
doubt that additional rate hikes are forthcoming (Crosson 2004). While
economists outside the Fed are willing to put a number on the neutral
rate—rates of 3.5 to 5.0 have been quoted in the press (Andrews 2004;
Crosson 2004)—the Fed prefers to remain circumspect, just as it did with
its ill-fated real rate target, simply defining it as the interest rate that nei-
ther provokes inflation nor slows down the economy (Andrews 2004).
Indeed, the notion of a neutral rate is not new, as the Fed also men-
tioned a neutral rate in discussions surrounding its tightening of 1994.
(For a critique,see James K.Galbraith 1994.) In truth,the neutral rate con-
cept is a variation on the old real rate notion. The real rate is associated
with the view that there is some unique “natural” interest rate consistent
with economic growth at the “natural”full-employment rate,which can be
associated with the Nonaccelerating-Inflation Rate of Unemployment
(NAIRU). While internal discussions at the Fed sometimes distinguish
between real (inflation-adjusted) and nominal interest rates, the term
“neutral rate”can be used in either sense. It is the FFR that is supposed to
be consistent with NAIRU, whether the FFR is stated in nominal or infla-
tion-adjusted terms. When Greenspan first proposed the real rate target,
he wanted to use the existing real rate (admittedly, something that could
only be estimated to an approximation) as a signal of future inflation; the
Fed would then adjust policy to try to get the real rate to a noninflationary
neutral level. Now the Fed supposes there is some neutral interest rate andThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
proposes to gradually move the FFR to the targeted neutral rate. The dif-
ference may appear to be nothing but a technicality, but the old real rate
target really involved adjusting both the FFR and the market’s expectations
of inflation in order to move the real rate (the nominal FFR less expected
inflation) toward the purported neutral real rate. By contrast, the “new”
neutral rate could be identified as a nominal FFR of, say, 4 percent, which
the Fed can hit with perfect accuracy.Thus,while there may be uncertainty
regarding the value of the neutral rate, it can be hit with certainty once
identified. The old real rate target could not be hit with accuracy because
it depended on uncontrollable expectations of inflation. Hence, the neu-
tral rate target appears to rest on firmer foundations than the old, aban-
doned real rate target.
However, in practice, a neutral rate cannot be temporally or spatially
fixed—and that means it cannot be identified. Japan has maintained zero
overnight rates for much of the past decade, without managing to generate
even a hint of inflation, and only recently has it begun to recover. This
means that Japan’s neutral rate must have been below zero, a rate that can-
not be hit by policymakers.For four years the United States held the FFR at
1 percent, without sustaining robust growth or setting off significant infla-
tion. Indeed, economic growth began to falter before the recent rate hike,
and any price blips have been dismissed by the Fed as temporary and due
to factors unrelated to U.S.growth; hence,neutrality must have been below
1 percent for most of the previous four years. Leaving aside quibbles over
the current state of the economy, the question is whether the notion of a
neutral rate provides a firm basis for policy formation. If the neutral rate is
unknown and if it varies through time and across nations,presumably with
the state of the economy,it cannot provide useful guidance.Rather,the Fed
must focus on current and projected economic growth and inflation data.
When growth and inflation reach the range desired by the Fed,then the Fed
can stop adjusting the FFR.In other words,the notion of a neutral rate does
not provide any additional useful guidance.
The Fed and conventional wisdom alike view a 1 percent FFR target as
necessarily “accommodative,”and rate hikes, therefore, as “inevitable,”with-
out any clear explanation as to why an undoubtedly “low”rate is an “accom-
modative” rate. An accommodative rate ought to be one that stimulates
robust spending, as the Fed “accommodates” an expansion. But the United14 Public Policy Brief, No. 80
States has not yet begun a robust recovery. When compared with other
recent recoveries, it would appear that we have several years to go before a
policy shift would be deemed appropriate. There has been no wage-push
cost spiral, and other than some limited “shocks,” price inflation—by the
Fed’s own admission—is not poised to get out of hand (Wray 2004). By
the same token,given the huge increase in the debt load carried by the pri-
vate sector, maintenance of low interest rates would seem to be prudent in
the face of a weak,nearly jobless recovery.The downside risks to raising debt
service ratios at this point in the recovery could easily outweigh the benefits
of enhancing the credibility of the Fed’s inflation-fighting machismo.
Thus, it appears the Fed raised rates in the presence of evidence con-
trary to its belief that the FFR was overly accommodative. The Fed offers
as justification an unknown neutral rate that is supposedly above the FFR,
along with the promise that once the FFR gets to the neutral rate, the Fed
will be able to recognize this achievement. Can policy making become
more convoluted than that?
The Deliberations of 1994: A Trial Run with the New Monetary
Consensus
A detailed examination of the deliberations of 1994 demonstrates that all
of the key ingredients of what this brief has called the practical application
of the new monetary consensus were already present in embryonic form:
transparency, gradualism, activism, neutral rates, and low inflation as the
official goal,although there was considerable concern with asset prices and
distributional variables. We will explore the first four components in this
section, and look at the final two components in a later section.
A.Representative González Applies Pressure,Forcing the Fed 
to Increase Transparency
To put matters in context,it is useful to remember that FOMC deliberations
before 1994 were highly secretive and that rate hikes were disguised in coded
releases as decisions to “increase slightly the degree of pressure on reserve
positions.” It was left to markets to figure out what FFR target the FOMC
had in mind. Further, by the end of 1993, the Fed’s relations with Congress
were rather strained for two reasons. First, there was fear that Fed officialsThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
were leaking decisions to market favorites, perhaps through government
officials outside the Fed. Second, some in Congress worried that the Fed
had a bias against employment and growth. Critics of the Fed, led by
Representative Henry González,chairman of the House Banking Committee,
called for greater transparency (FOMC 1993, conference call of October 5).
This conflict came to a head when Chairman Greenspan apparently
made less than forthright statements about the existence of detailed tran-
scripts of FOMC meetings, initially implying that no records were kept. As
it happened,written records of all FOMC deliberations since 1976 did exist,
and pressure was applied on the FOMC for their release. The Fed debated
the political and economic consequences of greater transparency, and even-
tually agreed to release transcripts and other materials associated with
FOMC meetings. The material is now available on the Fed’s website with a
five-year lag. (See FOMC 1993, 1994, specifically the period from October
1993 to May 1994, for discussions surrounding the wisdom of operating
with greater openness—and for fascinating internal discussions about how
to deal with González and Congress.) Now,of course,the Fed not only warns
that rates “must rise at some point”long in advance of its decisions to reverse
policy, but it also announces precisely what its target FFR is. Hence, trans-
parency has increased greatly over the past decade. Still, because of the five-
year lag on releasing transcripts,we cannot know exactly what deliberations
led to the most recent rate hikes.Thus,we cannot know for sure that history
is repeating itself, but it certainly does rhyme, as a comparison of the tran-
scripts of 1994 with the Fed’s public statements in 2004 shows.
B.The Decision to Raise Rates
When the FOMC met in early February 1994,committee member Thomas
Melzer expressed concern that “the stance of monetary policy has been
very expansionary for about the last three years” (FOMC 1994, p. 26).
During that period, policymakers had held rates relatively low; since
October 1992, the FFR had hovered around 3 percent, and there had not
been a rate hike in five years. Several of the governors mentioned strong
growth, tight labor markets, accelerating growth of consumer debt, “a
rather euphoric stock market,”unemployment rates reaching their NAIRU
estimates, and a disappearing gap between actual and potential GDP as
justification for the belief that inflation was likely to pick up.16 Public Policy Brief, No. 80
Still, many FOMC members mentioned mitigating factors. The most
recent data available to them showed some slowing of growth and of infla-
tion. According to data provided by FOMC staff for that meeting, GDP
had grown at 3.9 percent in 1992, but at only 2.8 percent in 1993;
Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation had declined from 3.1 percent in
1992 to 2.7 percent in 1993. Further, the unemployment rate stood at 6.5
percent in 1993—at the high end of most estimates of the NAIRU. A sur-
vey of FOMC members taken for the meeting put their 1994 projections
for real GDP growth in the range of 2.75 to 3.5, for the CPI at 2.5 to 3.0,
and for the unemployment rate at 6.5 to 6.75, with little change in any of
these variables for 1995.In other words,the FOMC was not projecting sig-
nificantly tighter labor markets or higher inflation in spite of its obvious
belief that the time had come for rate hikes (FOMC 1994,Material for Staff
Presentation to the Federal Open Market Committee, Feb. 3).
At the FOMC’s previous meeting in December, Secretary and
Economist Donald Kohn (later elevated to Fed governor) had argued that
“at some point in the current expansion the federal funds rate would have
to be raised to contain inflation,”and that “tightening would need to begin
before there were clear signs in broad-based indexes that the trend of infla-
tion has changed.” He warned that if “a stronger growth path” took hold,
“a tightening fairly soon would seem to be called for” (FOMC 1993,
“Policy Options,” Appendix to Transcripts, Dec. 21). While several other
FOMC members also cited “stronger growth” as a justification for rate
hikes,Governor Jordan objected,saying that the Fed should not be seen as
opposing economic growth.“It puts us into a way of being perceived, and
maybe we perceive ourselves, that says if we’re anti-inflation, we’re anti-
g r o w t h  ...I  w ould suggest being careful about saying that we want to
maintain a degree of unemployment or idle capacity or subpotential
growth” (FOMC 1993, Dec. 21, p. 33). At the February 3–4 meeting,
Jordan expressed hope that if the FOMC decided to raise rates,the “ration-
ale for it as a growth-sustaining move”would be made clear,“not an anti-
growth move but one that is designed to enhance the longevity of this
expansion.” Indeed, a good deal of that February meeting was devoted to
the public relations spin that should be put on the decision to raise rates.
While FOMC staff and several governors mentioned that a case could be
made to hold off on rate increases, they all seemed to believe that the timeThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
had come. The only significant questions were how many basis points the
target would be increased, and exactly how the policy change would be
announced.
C.Greenspan Pushes for Consensus
At the February meeting, Chairman Greenspan worried about maintain-
ing “flexibility,”fearing that by making its intentions to raise rates clear,the
Fed would set a precedent. However, because this would be the first rate
change in a long time,he warned,“we are going to have to make our action
very visible”with “no ambiguity about our move.”Breaking with tradition,
he didn’t want to leave it up to markets to guess the Fed’s intended target.
He went on, “I would very much like to have the permission of the
Committee to announce that we’re doing it and to state that the announce-
ment is an extraordinary event”(FOMC 1994, Feb. 3–4, p. 29). Further, he
insisted that the vote to raise rates would have to be unanimous. “I also
would be concerned if this Committee were not in concert because at this
stage we as a Committee are going to have to do things which the rest of
the world is not going to like. We have to do them because that’s our job”
(p. 55). While some members wanted a 50-basis-point hike, Greenspan
argued for a 25-basis-point increase, on the justification that financial
markets could not bear a larger increase (more below).Finally,he pleaded,
“I rarely ask this, as you know. This is one of the times when we really are
together and I’d hate to have our vote somehow imply something other
than the agreement for a tightening move that in fact exists in this
Committee.” When the FOMC unanimously voted for a 25-basis-point
hike,he gushed,“I thank you for that.I think it’s the right move.I think in
retrospect when we’re looking back at what we’re doing over the next year
we’ll find that it was the right decision”(p. 58).
D.An Active Fed Is a Credible Fed!
The question remains: Why was it so critical to take action in early
February 1994? We now know, of course, that a robust expansion really
would not get under way for another two years, and that growth contin-
ued for another six years after 1994 with no pickup of inflation and with
unemployment rates eventually dropping far below conventional NAIRU
estimates. Indeed, at a May 1994 meeting following several rate hikes,18 Public Policy Brief, No. 80
Governor Jordan argued that “where we are is not that we are entering the
fourth year of the expansion, but rather that we are someplace in the first
year of a classic expansion” (FOMC 1994, May 17, p. 23)—a view that, in
retrospect, seems quite correct! 
Why, then, did the FOMC begin to raise rates in February, and con-
tinue to raise them over the next year by a total of 300 basis points—at the
very beginning of expansion? The answer was articulated by a number of
FOMC participants: to enhance the Fed’s credibility as an inflation fighter.
As Governor J.Alfred Broaddus said,“I really think the System’s anti-infla-
tionary stance has done a great deal to increase our credibility in recent
years” (FOMC 1994, Feb. 3–4, p. 23). Added Vice Chairman William J.
McDonough,“A 25 basis point move ...w ould send the right signal in the
sense that the Federal Reserve, the central bank, is being watchful, as it
should be.And we would be moving earlier in the economic cycle than the
Fed has done historically and, therefore, we are doing our job even better
than in the past” (p. 46). And Governor Robert Forrestal said,“I think we
will gain credibility by moving now even though there might be some
marginal risk that we might have to reverse course”(p.49).In other words,
the earlier the Fed moves to “preempt” inflation, the greater its inflation-
fighting credibility! An active Fed is a credible Fed, and the sooner it acts,
the better.
E.Gradualism and the Neutral Rate
After the February rate increase, financial markets stumbled—as
Chairman Greenspan had feared. At the March 22, 1994 meeting, the
FOMC discussed these developments, with many arguing that while there
was no evidence of rising inflation, short-term interest rates were still
overly accommodative and well below a “neutral” rate. Governor Jordan
admitted that “I don’t know where neutral is”but “I feel very strongly that
we are nowhere near a neutral stance and that we ought to be aggressive in
moving toward it” (FOMC 1994, March 22, p. 52). Chairman Greenspan
noted that the committee had held “expectations that we would prick the
bubble in the equity markets”with the February hike,and while he favored
getting “policy to neutrality as fast as we can,”he didn’t believe “the finan-
cial system can take a very large increase without a break in its tensile
strength—which we strained significantly the last time but did not break”The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
(p.43).Hence,he favored a gradual series of small rate hikes to get the FFR
to the 4 to 4.5 percent range. If the market came to expect 25-basis-point
hikes at each subsequent FOMC meeting until “neutrality” was achieved,
this would “break the bubble”in equity markets while still “restoring con-
fidence in the System”(p.44).We see the justification for gradualism in the
fear that the impact of large rate hikes on financial markets would be too
big. A gradual movement toward neutrality would avoid unnecessary
impacts,especially on financial markets,even as expectations of continued
small hikes would “prick”bubbles and allow for soft landings.
Lessons from the 1994 Experiment
The FOMC transcripts offer valuable insights into the discussions that sur-
rounded the Fed’s decision to raise interest rates sharply in the early years
of the Clinton expansion.While we will not know for five years (when cur-
rent transcripts are released), it is likely that similar deliberations are tak-
ing place today, as the Fed embarks on a new series of rate hikes. Once the
1994 round of rate hikes was complete, the Fed held rates constant for a
very long time (until the beginning of the last recession). During the
Clinton boom, growth rates as well as unemployment rates reached levels
that the Fed had considered unsustainable during those 1993–94 delibera-
tions. We now know that Chairman Greenspan gradually developed the
view that better economic performance with low inflation was possible in
the 1990s because of favorable productivity growth.(The transcripts make
clear that even as early as February and March of 1994, he wondered
whether higher productivity growth might be changing the relationship
between economic growth and inflation.) Still,in February 1994 and again
in June 2004,Greenspan and the rest of the Fed moved to raise rates in the
earliest stage of recovery.
The other interesting thing about these transcripts is the labored
deliberations about increasing the transparency of Fed actions.Committee
members felt pressure from Congress and elsewhere to better communi-
cate their actions. They also came to believe that greater transparency
would reduce uncertainty in markets and might actually make it easier to
achieve desired policy objectives. This belief led to the current practice of
clearly announcing rate targets. It also evolved into the practice of20 Public Policy Brief, No. 80
telegraphing policy changes long before they occur—apparently to prepare
financial markets and avoid crashes like the stock market decline of 1987
and the bond market collapse of 1994. However, it is notable that neither
the “irrational exuberance” of the post-1996 stock market bubble nor its
2000 crash appear to have been moderated by increased Fed transparency.
The Fed’s attempt to “prick the bubble” in 1994 caused only a temporary
setback for the euphoria that would develop over the next six years (and
Greenspan’s belief that equities markets had already experienced euphoria
by 1993 casts some doubt on his ability to read financial markets). Hence,
the assumption that a long series of small and expected rate increases would
prick financial bubbles appears to be incorrect—as does Greenspan’s later
ill-fated attempt to scare markets with talk of “irrational exuberance.”
Finally, the Fed appears to be aware that its adoption of transparency
and gradualism means that it surrenders a degree of discretion to market
expectations. Policymakers must continually take the pulse of the market
to ensure that these expectations are not disappointed. As the minutes of
the June 30, 2004 meeting make clear, the FOMC’s recent decision to
reverse policy was based in large measure on the market’s expectation that
rates would be raised. The minutes suggest that the May decision to leave
rates unchanged was “fully anticipated” by markets, but that after May,
markets expected a rate hike—an expectation the Fed felt compelled to
oblige. In his September 8, 2004 testimony before the House Committee
on the Budget, Greenspan admitted that “inflation and inflation expecta-
tions have eased in recent months” as the economy “hit a soft patch” and
“employment gains moderated notably.” Still, the chairman and the Fed
raised rates a third time on September 21 (and a fourth time on November
10), ostensibly to keep pace with the expectations of rate hikes generated
by the FOMC through its public pronouncements about the “inevitability”
of rate hikes. Like a cat chasing its tail, the Fed will perversely continue to
follow expectations upward,pushing rates to the 4 to 4.5 percent range the
market has come to expect as “inevitable” based on public statements by
Fed officials.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 21
The Fed’s Secrets?
This brings us to another important lesson that can be learned from the
1994 transcripts. The Fed would like to be perceived as “above the fray,”
making policy decisions free from political influence in a dispassionate
quest to wring inflation from the economy.To that end,the Fed would like
to stay out of debates about employment, income distribution, and more
specifically, differential  impacts of rate changes on different groups.
Chairman Greenspan and other Fed officials have argued that it is nearly
impossible to determine whether a housing market bubble currently exists,
and are therefore loathe to be seen as attempting to burst real estate markets
through rate hikes (Bloomberg News 2004). Further, while the chairman
famously mused about the “irrational exuberance” of equity prices during
the New Economy boom, he later denied that the Fed targets asset prices.
However,we know from the transcripts that the Fed was,indeed,con-
sciously trying to “prick”what it perceived to be an equity price bubble in
1994. Further, it is clear from the transcripts that a primary reason for
choosing the path of“gradualism”back in 1994 was an attempt to engineer
a “soft landing” for financial markets. Some FOMC members were con-
vinced that the “real” part of the economy could handle a much quicker
pace of rate hikes, but the chairman convinced them that a long series of
small steps would be needed to avoid a financial market crash.His case was
strengthened when the first 25-basis-point rate increase had a larger than
desired impact on financial markets.
Further, Governor Lindsey presented detailed data at the February
1994 meeting demonstrating that there had been “a big change in the func-
tional distribution of income away from wages” (FOMC 1994, p. 21). He
estimated that most interest income receipts went to groups that were
unlikely to borrow (the rich and the nonpoor elderly), while most bor-
rowers had to rely on income from work. From this, he surmised that
measured debt burdens were misleadingly low because the “middle-class,
middle-aged people who are borrowing are really getting their income
squeezed.” He concluded that unless employment and wages picked up,
“the capacity of households to take on ever more debt is going to have to
stop at some point, and perhaps sooner than we think” (p. 22). The tran-
scripts make clear that the other FOMC members were impressed with the
thoroughness of Lindsey’s analysis. Of course, increasing interest rates22 Public Policy Brief, No. 80
would tend to boost interest income for those with financial wealth and
little debt, while at the same time raising debt burdens and reducing the
after-interest income of “middle-class, middle-aged” people. Lindsey and
others recognized that just as rate hikes differentially affect real versus
financial markets, they also differentially affect incomes. Still, the FOMC
unanimously voted to raise rates, in spite of the recognition that this
would “squeeze” debtors. If anything, the squeeze today is worse, as we
have had a decade-long run-up of private sector indebtedness. In public
pronouncements, Greenspan has recognized this, but argued that debtors
can probably handle the rising burden.
Moreover,the Fed recognizes that price increases to date have far out-
stripped labor compensation increases, a fact reflected in record profits
accruing to owners. In 1983, proprietor income as a percent of personal
income was 4 percent; it rose to 8.6 percent in 2000 and to 9.3 percent in
2003. Corporate profits were 8.6 percent of national income in 1983, rose
to 9.3 percent in 2000, and continued to rise to 11.5 percent in 2003.
Capital’s share is considerably higher than it was in the aftermath of the
Reagan recession, and it has also attained levels higher than at the peak of
the Clinton expansion. By contrast, wages as a share of personal income
fell from 57 percent in 1983 to 55 percent in 2003.Indeed,while unit labor
costs (the wages paid to workers to produce one unit of output) actually
fell between 2000 and 2003 (from 0.672 to 0.670 per unit of real gross
value added), after-tax profits rose significantly (from 0.058 to 0.070,
including inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments; BEA
2004). In other words, any inflation recorded today represents “profits
inflation,”or windfall gains to owners who have taken advantage of either
rising labor productivity or supply bottlenecks, a point emphasized by
Greenspan when he said that all inflation between the first quarter of 2003
and the first quarter of 2004 “can be attributed to a rise in profit margins
rather than rising cost pressures”(Greenspan 2004).
Despite its commitment to price stability, the Fed patiently accepted
this profits-led inflation for a variety of reasons. One of the most impor-
tant facts recognized by the Fed was business slack. Chairman Greenspan
noted that “caution among business executives” was finally being eroded
by high profitability, and speculated that allowing windfall gains might
eventually convince firms “that they have no choice but to increase theirThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 23
workforces”(Greenspan 2004). Further, Greenspan was confident that the
extraordinary profits would be temporary: “If history is any guide, com-
petitive pressures, at some point, will shift in favor of real hourly compen-
sation at the expense of corporate profits.”Still, even if real compensation
to workers began to rise, profits might move in the opposite direction,
holding prices down. Hence, the Fed has argued that inflation will remain
low even if wages rise, but it has nonetheless raised rates in anticipation of
the inflation that will “inevitably” arise if wage growth outstrips produc-
tivity and competitively induced reductions of profit margins.
Some commentators have noticed that while the Fed appears willing
to accept profit-led inflation, it remains averse to wage-led inflation. It is
probable that the Fed believes that profit-led inflation is self-limiting
(windfall profits lead to increased production, which relieves pressures on
prices), but that wage-led inflation can be self-reinforcing if a wage-price
spiral is created. The Fed’s belief ought to be modified in the context of
today’s open economy because it is no longer clear that domestic wages can
rise in the presence of low-wage, offshore competition. With unionization
rates falling, and at the current rate of job creation, it seems unlikely that
labor costs will exert pressure on prices any time soon. It must be remem-
bered that in the last half of the 1990s, relatively robust growth (and job 
creation consistently above two million per year) occurred without signifi-
cant price pressure. Further, there is quite a contrast between the Fed’s 
willingness to accept profit-led inflation in order to bring forth entrepre-
neurial initiative and its lack of tolerance for rising wages to reward worker
initiative. And while higher profits will bring forth more capital, the Fed
discounts the ability of higher wages to bring workers into labor markets.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Fed is biased against labor.
The Fed cannot help but notice that interest rate changes do have dis-
tributional impacts—a fact driven home by Governor Lindsey’s calcula-
tions. Rate changes, and anticipations of rate changes, have large and
potentially disruptive impacts on financial markets. As we’ve seen, part of
the justification for gradualism and telegraphic statements of intentions is
the necessity to “prepare”financial markets. In addition, rate hikes mostly
work on the “real economy” through different interest rate sensitivities
(“elasticities”) and spending propensities (proportions of extra income
spent). There is little evidence that business investment is highly interest24 Public Policy Brief, No. 80
sensitive, as rate changes are easily swamped by other effects, such as prof-
itability considerations (Fazzari et al.1988; Chirinko et al.1999; Hannsgen
forthcoming). In the consumer sector, households are net interest recipi-
ents. Therefore, if all households spent equal shares of their income, per-
manent rate hikes could stimulate consumption spending by raising net
interest receipts. This stimulative, redistributive effect (from government
and business to households) could offset other, negative effects. However,
as Governor Lindsey emphasized, interest income is very unequally dis-
tributed, and spending propensities do vary. If interest recipients spend
more of their income than those who do not receive net interest income,
then rate hikes could stimulate spending.This could be the case,for exam-
ple, if creditors are seniors living on interest income. Further, and this is
important, the federal government is a very large net payer of interest to
the private sector, so rate hikes increase budget deficits and hence stimu-
late private spending—to a degree that has not yet been reliably estimated.
From this, we can conclude that interest rate changes certainly do
“work”at least partially (if not mainly) through distributional effects, but
these effects are complex and little studied. Almost all empirical work
focuses on (small) interest rate sensitivities of private sector spending,and
ignores potentially large distributional effects. It is conceivable that distri-
butional effects all “wash out,” so that interest rate policy has the conven-
tional direction—rate increases lower spending—but we really do not
know. In any case, the Fed’s secret cannot be denied: there are distribu-
tional effects,and the Fed considers them in its meetings.Also,there seems
to be something of an asymmetric bias toward profit income and against
wage income, and toward net interest recipients and against net debtors.
The evidence for this proposition is the Fed’s behavior: it raises interest
rates at the first hint that labor markets are recovering and at a pace that
financial markets can “handle,” so that net creditors will receive the inter-
est that is squeezed out of debtors.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 25
Conclusion: An Innocent Fraud?
“Keynesian” economists have always been skeptical of the Fed’s ability to
“fine-tune” the economy, in spite of the long-running monetarist claims
about the efficacy of monetary policy. The canonization of Chairman
Greenspan over the past decade and a half has eliminated most orthodox
(Friedmanite) squeamishness about a discretionary Fed, while currently
fashionable theory based on the “new monetary consensus” has pushed
monetary policy front and center. As John Kenneth Galbraith recently
argued, lack of empirical support for such beliefs has not dampened
enthusiasm. Like Galbraith, the followers of Keynes have always insisted
that “business firms borrow when they can make money and not because
interest rates are low” (Galbraith 2004, p. 45). Even orthodox estimates of
the interest rate sensitivity of investment are so low that the typical rate
adjustments used by the Fed cannot have much effect on overall spending.
However, distributional effects of rate hikes, though little studied and
poorly understood, are probably significant and pernicious.
In his new book, Galbraith takes on what he calls “innocent fraud,”or
the conventional view that is both incorrect and also “serves, or is not
adverse to, influential economic, political and social interest”(2004, p. xi).
To limit unemployment and recession in the United States
and the risk of inflation, the remedial entity is the Federal
Reserve System,the central bank.For many years (with more
to come) this has been under the direction from Washington
of a greatly respected chairman, Mr. Alan Greenspan. The
institution and its leader are the ordained answer to both
boom and inflation and recession or depression . . . Quiet
measures enforced by the Federal Reserve are thought to be
the best approved, best accepted of economic actions. They
are also manifestly ineffective. They do not accomplish what
they are presumed to accomplish. Recession and unemploy-
ment or boom and inflation continue.Here is our most cher-
ished and, on examination, most evident form of fraud.
(Galbraith 2004, pp. 43–44)26 Public Policy Brief, No. 80
In a sense, the Fed has become entrapped within its own mythology,
or “innocent fraud.”It is held accountable both for smoothing the business
cycle—a task for which it disclaims responsibility even as it (quietly)
accepts credit when things go well—and for fighting inflation that will not
show up for years.The only tool at its disposal is the FFR,a variable that is
not tightly linked to the economic phenomena of greatest interest, such as
employment and unemployment, wage and price inflation, or investment
and economic growth. Worse, to sustain credibility, it must act in accor-
dance with market expectations—expectations that it plays no small role
in generating. The Greenspan-led Fed prides itself on the increased trans-
parency under which it operates, which in part takes the form of well-
telegraphed intentions.When combined with the gradualism championed
by Governor Bernanke (and piloted in 1994), changes of policy course are
slowly played out over many quarters.This has the obvious advantage that
surprises are avoided, but it also means that the Fed is a slave to market
expectations that force it to stay the course.
It is ironic that greater transparency has reduced the Fed’s ability to
engage in truly discretionary policy. By telegraphing its moves long in
advance, it is then committed to raising rates to fulfill the expectations it
creates.This means the Fed’s policy is hyperactive but with little discretion.
The latest rate hike thus seems destined to follow the precedent set in 1994,
when the Fed began to raise rates based on the argument that inflation
would appear sooner or later. In retrospect, we know that the recovery
from the recession of the early 1990s had not even begun with vigor by
1994, that labor markets would not become tight until many millions
more jobs had been created, and that inflationary pressures would never
become significant in spite of the strength of the Clinton boom.
We cannot know whether robust job creation would have begun sooner
if the Fed had not raised rates in 1994. We cannot know whether the Fed’s
rate hikes in 1999 brought on a deeper and longer recession than would have
been created by Clinton’s surplus-induced fiscal headwinds alone. We do
know that the increase of rates beginning in 1994 did not bring growth and
unemployment into the ranges believed by the FOMC to be sustainable. In
fact, growth picked up, employment boomed, and inflation fell.
Further, we do not know whether discretion could work better than
Friedman’s rules, because our hyperactive Fed is not necessarily a discre-The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 27
tionary Fed. Prudent policymakers could preserve options if they did not
create market expectations of “inevitable” rate hikes that they then felt
compelled to make without regard to economic performance. Given the
lack of credible evidence that the Fed can impact important economic
variables in a desired manner, and given the Fed’s own doubts about the
relations between these variables and inflation, a less preemptive Fed pol-
icy would seem to be in order. Finally, given all the uncertainty about the
level of the “neutral”FFR,it makes little sense to change policy in an effort
to find that elusive rate. Indeed, a very good case could be made that the
neutral rate is a Japan-like zero—but exploration of that issue would take
us too far afield.
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